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Policy Laundering Issues at ICAO
That
ICAO is being used as a vehicle to push through controversial policies
by a few influential states is evidenced by the lack of open debate on
such divisive issues. The development of the use of biometric
identifiers in travel documents is being driven by states, such as the
United Kingdom and the United States that invariably wish to advocate
some form of identity document with biometrics in their domestic
states, but are being confronted by political opposition. ICAO, as a
wholly non-democratic forum, allows for the growth and implementation
of such policies supported by an "everyone else is doing it" argument.
The
United State's 2002, Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
set the ball rolling by requiring citizens from countries who are
subject to the Visa Waiver Programme to hold machine readable passports
that are tamper resistance and that incorporate biometric identifiers
which comply with applicable biometric standards. To remain eligible
for the visa waiver programme, states had to implement this scheme by
October 2004. Additionally, it required any visas to be issued by the
U.S. Government to 'aliens' to contain biometric identifiers. At
the time of the introduction of the Act, ICAO had provisionally
approved facial recognition, iris scanning and finger printing, however
there was much uncertainty as to which biometric identifiers would be
appropriate. Consequently, the time frame dictated by the United States
provided little opportunity for deliberation on such a controversial
issue.
As
the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act required an
ICAO-approved biometric, the United States urgently needed ICAO to
endorse the implementation of biometrics as demonstrated in an action telegram to
ICAO. As the summary provides, "it is of paramount interest to the
department for the ICAO Air Transport Committee at its May 22nd meeting
to endorse the specifications on biometrics and travel
documents.…(the) Mission should take necessary action to achieve
this objective". The document concludes it is in the mutual interests
of the U.S. Government and the countries who participate in the visa
waiver programme to make progress towards compliance with the U.S
imposed deadline of October 2004, "but governments will not be able to
make such progress unless the air transport committee endorses the
specifications on biometrics and MRTDs that were approved by TAG".
Finally, the United States claims that "if ICAO does not act
expeditiously on the subject of biometrics in travel documents, other
organisations may attempt to take over this role".
Furthermore, concerned sentiments were expressed at a European Forum for Travel Documents that
"dialogue in the EU was being driven by demands of US legislation" and
"the terms and timetable of the debate set by US security concerns
rather than common EU principles and decisions". The same U.S. written
document emanating from the European Forum arrogantly concludes that
"without the pressure generated by the U.S. Enhanced Border Security
Act to overhaul passport production, the conference would have remained
highly technical and dull", however it acknowledges that
arguments stating the measures are designed to protect U.S. borders
were not sufficiently convincing. That ICAO is being used as a means
for the United States to implement national security policy is clearly
evident from this statement, however it is submitted that United
State's border protection is not within the jurisdction of ICAO
nor within its stated aims.
The
biometric identifier chosen for the visa waiver countries is currently
facial recognition, however the potential, and highly likely, use of
iris scanning and finger printing is still being considered. ICAO
documents released in recent years demonstrate that there has been
resistance to the use of these biometrics, particularly fingerprinting
and 'major concerns' cited include the political and technical aspects
of their collection and storage.
The United Kingdom and the United States have been particularly prominent in advocating biometrics as demonstrated below.
The United States:
A comprehenisve white paper produced by the American Civil Liberties Union highlights in detail the security issues regarding the use of biometric information on documents and how vulnerable such technologies are despite their alleged infallibility. The paper, available here, outlines how the United States specifically fought against
privacy and security protections in order to fast track the creation of
standards for electronic passports.
Below
is a brief indication as to how the United States has attempted to push
aside consideration of the use of biometrics and use ICAO as a closed,
fast-track process for policy implementation:
Notes from Meeting of ICAO New Technologies Working Group - 25th-28th June 2002
The United States' border security laws concerning the requirement of a
biometric identifier for travellers to the U.S. were discussed at this
meeting and several states voiced reservations over the scheme. Notably,
- the issue of acceptance of biometrics by citizens was raised by several states;
- the U.S. was accused of a "knee-jerk" reaction to September 11th 2001;
- the timeframe dictated by the
U.S. for implementation of the 'biometric solutions' was felt by many
delegates to be too short, thus rendering implementation difficult,
particularly because at this point the biometric solution had not been
selected;
- the prospect of storing full
images, rather than templates, raised privacy concerns especially the
possibility of an ability to skim data;
- the storage of full images
eliminates the use of barcodes and instead "drives countries into the
use of costly high capacity RF chips in passports (an issue that
requires more time and testing)";
- concerns were also raised that
the use of full images would result in lengthier download times and
thus result in delays in passenger processing.
The
National Institute of Standards and Technology is testing the use of
biometrics on behalf of the United States and the ICAO-NTWG chairman
offered, at this meeting, to convene with NIST officials in order
to convey ICAO concerns regarding the 'solutions'. It is not clear
whether this meeting occurred. The U.S. however acknowledge recognition
that a 'communicative process' needs to be initiated 'aimed at
minimizing the concerns of foreign governments and promoting buy-in
partnership that must be formed to implement the laws successfully'.
Attendees at the meeting comprised of representatives from the United
States, Japan, UK, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia,
Latvia and Canada. Attendant organizations were Interpol, ISO, Airports
Council International and International Air Transport Association. This
is a very small pool of representatives to be responsible for setting a
global agenda.
New Zealand expressed many reservations regarding the use of biometrics, which are also evidenced in some form of a questionnaire
exchanged between New Zealand and the United States (although it is
likely to be one of many sent to various governments). New Zealand
reaffirms its resistance, stating many of its citizens "associate
fingerprints with criminal activity and would be very concerned about
them being required for U.S. visas". Instead, it is evaluating facial
recognition technology and "no other biometric is being seriously
considered".
The last question on the questionnaire posed by the United States asks
whether the answering governments would impose a requirement that US
passports have biometric identifiers and to indicate which biometric
may be chosen. It is submitted that this question represents an example
of policy laundering: The U.S. government may not be able to
domestically mandate for biometric passports and other documents,
however if several foreign countries are going to require all visitors
have travel documents containing biometrics then it becomes a much more
palatable initiative back on US soil.
Aside from international concerns regarding the use of fingerprints, the issues have been raised domestically too. An information memorandum
to a representative from the Department of State from U.S. passport
services highlights that the use of ten print fingerprints is
unnecessary to ensure document integrity and full image fingerprints
would involve expensive storage solutions. The document also states
that full image fingerprints are vulnerable to misuse. It proceeds to
categorically state that "Fingerprint technology should not be used in
the U.S. passport" for the following reasons:
- Some national laws of foreign
states will not permit the storage of fingerprints in databases nor
will they use fingerprints in their passports, especially due
to connotations of criminality;
- Potential negative impact on tourism;
- Full images of fingerprints are vulnerable and thus impact on privacy issues;
- The storage of such images will be expensive;
- Slow download times could create delays at entry points;
- Due to their intrusive nature,
there is likely to be a high level of resistance and consequently the
Department (of State) must be prepared to establish a highly
transparent process of working with oversight committees concerning on
the selection and prescribed use. "Full fingerprint images that would
be read by other nations will be nearly impossible to justify".
Despite
the reservations expressed about using fingerprint technology, the
document also acknowledges the National Institute for Standards and
Technology's (NIST) promotion of fingerprints but counters that their
tests conducted so far have been within the confines of a laboratory
and are unlikely to operate effectively in a practical application.
It is also evident that it is not solely NIST who wish to promote the use of fingerprints in documents. An email to
a representative from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
illustrates a strong preference by DHS and the Immigration
Naturalisation Service (INS) for the use of fingerprints on passports.
The author of the email states in reference to a recent ICAO NTWG
meeting, "we have not wavered on selection of the face image as a
minimum biometric" and then proceeds to discuss available storage for
fingerprints "for whatever you need for your (the DHS) purposes". This
is a clear demonstration of ICAO being used by US departments to ensure
the passage of domestic policies.
Memorandum from the United States Department of State
The subject of the memorandum is the ICAO Document Content and Format
Working Group (DCFWG), which is one of the three working groups
covering the development of machine readable travel documents. The
United States affirms in the text of the document that "the United
States has had leadership roles in all three Working Groups (WGs),
which has ensured that U.S. positions are advocated and honoured". Such
a privileged and influential position maintained by the United States
is undoubtedly as a result of the financial contributions proffered by
the country to the ICAO, which is examined in further detail at the 'ICAO Documents' page.
The
memorandum also proceeds to outline two tasks to be achieved at the
next ICAO-DCFWH, which was held in Prague on 15th-17th September 2004.
Primarily, the U.S wishes to identify text changes to Document 9303,
which compiles the set of standards required by ICAO-TAG's endorsement
of facial images as the favoured biometric for passports and the use of
contactless chips and 'to begin the vetting process'. Secondly, the
U.S. wishes to assist the International Labour Organisation to develop
standards for a seaman's identification certificate, while maintaining
their own position on visas.Again this is a clear example of a powerful
country imposing its desired policies on an international field.
More information on biometrics and related issues can be found at Travel Surveillance, Identity Documents and Migration and Border Controls.
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