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ICAO Activities

Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD)
The definition of a machine readable travel document (MRTD) is an international travel document that contains data both readable by the human eye and also by machine. A simple form of a machine readable passport has been in circulation for several years - the key characteristic being the machine readable strip at the bottom of the 'personal details' page, although not all countries currently issue this type of passport. ICAO guidelines have made this simple version mandatory by 2010.

The next level of MRTDs is currently being developed which will entail the incorporation of radio frequency identification chips, to allow information to be 'read' without machine contact, and an expansion of the sources of personal identification data to include biometrics. In addition, the variety of travel documents incorporating these new technologies is to be expanded. These 'advancements' have been strongly advocated by, and through, ICAO, who have issued specifications and standards as to the characteristics MRTDs should possess and the format they should adopt to accommodate 'global inter-operability'. These are outlined in further detail below on the basis of ICAO reports and therefore for a more objective analysis of the issues raised, readers are advised to visit the issues pages.

Biometrics
Although the use of biometrics has been investigated by groups within ICAO for approximately 6 years, the events of September 11th 2001 motivated 'increased activity in the development of various biometric studies, experiments, pilot programs and products'. Below is a brief overview of developments concerning the use of biometrics since 2001 within ICAO:

  • In February 2002, a biometrics selection report recommended the biometrics applicable to MRTDs as facial recognition, fingerprints and iris scans.
  • In June 2002, a meeting of NTWG was convened in Germany and a resolution was published stating that ICAO TAG-MRTD/NTWG endorses the use of face recognition as the globally interoperable biometric for machine assisted identity confirmation with MRTDs. It was further recognised that member states may elect to use fingerprint and/or iris recognition as additional biometric technologies. The face was considered to be the optimum biometric for a variety of reasons including it being less intrusive in nature, less costly, more acceptable, no requirement of physical presence and simpler to obtain.
  • In March 2003, at an NTWG conference in the USA, a further resolution was published in order to clarify the resolution made in Germany. This reiterates the content of the above and adds that member states, 'in their initial deployment of MRTDs with biometric identifiers, are encouraged to adopt contactless IC media of sufficient capacity to facilitate on-board storage of additional MRTD data and biometric identifiers'.

The most recent Technical Report released by TAG and NTWG on "Biometrics Deployment of Machine Readable Travel Documents" (Version 2.0) provides information on the use of biometrics in travel documents. Below is an outline of the form of the potential scheme and some of the issues mentioned in the text, although please view the 'Policy Laundering Issues at ICAO' section for a more objective overview of this issue:

Benefits according to ICAO
NTWG/TAG highlights the perceived applications of biometrics to include:
  • The use of an applicant's biometric template to search against other biometric databases such as criminal record databases or other passport databases;
  • The verification of an applicant at the collection of a passport against the initial captured template;
  • The identification of staff undertaking the enrolment;
  • The verification of a person's identity when they leave/enter a country to confirm they are that person and to enhance the effectiveness of Advance Passenger Information (API) systems;
  • Establishing when a travel document has been altered.

Constraints according to ICAO
NTWG/TAG do acknowledge that there are constraints on the effectiveness of biometrics which include:
  • Further rapid development of biometric technologies;
  • Uncertain durability over a ten year period;
  • Uncertainty as to effectiveness of confirming the identity of an individual on a one to many basis such as against a large national database;
  • Data protection and privacy laws and cultural practices

Location of data
There are three potential methods of identity confirmation associated with MRTDs. These are:
  • Carriage on the identity document or card - e.g. in a chip;
  • Held by receiving entity - e.g. on their central data base;
  • Derived from displayed feature on the identity document - e.g. the photograph on the data page.

ePassports
An ePassport or electronic passport is an MRTD passport that has a contactless integrated circuit chip imbedded in it. In striving for optimal standardisation the 'Biometrics Deployment of Machine Readable Travel Documents' report examines useability, data storage and performance of various technologies for storing data to assess which is the optimum technology - concluding that the contactless IC chip is the only one which meets all three requirements. In this regard:
  • The report states that border authorities have a strong desire for a contactless mode of operation. The NTWG concluded in the report that the only technology that does not require either direct or line of sight contact is the contactless IC chip. The recommended read distance is 0-10 centimetres.
  • With regard to data storage, the report discusses which technologies have sufficient capacity for the storage of biometrics. The report determines that the only technologies with this capacity are contact IC chips, contactless IC chips and optical memory.
  • Finally, contactless IC chips read faster than contact IC chips and therefore 'perform' better.

Discussion as to the data capacity of a contactless IC chip highlights other issues that need to be considered. In using multiple biometric identifiers, the size of the chip has to increase to accommodate this information. However the report urges issuing states to bear in mind 'that the new technology, very high capacity chips, can have larger overheads in terms of space required for memory management, operating systems and command sets'.

The report also suggests that due to issues of durability, states may consider moving to a 5 year validity period for travel documents for reasons such as technical flexibility, technology and security feature turnover. Comparisons are drawn with the current life of a smart card chip which is approximately 2-3 years. These issues are discussed further on the 'Issues' page.

Visas
The development of visas to include biometric information is being promoted on the basis that it will aid verification of the individual at the application stage and at the point of use on entry into a state and will eliminate multiple issue of visas to the same individual. A recommended pre-entry process is suggested by the TAG/NTWG in the report, 'Biometrics Deployment of Machine Readable Travel Documents'. This process involves:
  • Establishment of a biometric based identity for a non-citizen seeking entry;
  • Use of electronic databases to support eligibility processing;
  • Recording of applicant's data record into local (offshore) and central (onshore) database;
  • Issue of MRTD if all adjudication/eligibility checks are passed.
The resulting MRTD will either be a 'paper visa' or an 'electronic visa with Advance Passenger Processing' capability.


ICAO Arguments for 'next level' MRTDs
The ICAO promotes various arguments for MRTDs including:
  • The ability to check a document against a (criminal/terrorist) watch list;
  • The acceleration of clearance through passport controls;
  • The verification of authenticity of documents;
  • The ability to transmit document information to other databases;
  • The accommodation of the use of Advanced Passenger Information (API) systems;
  • The identification of people "who would misuse travel documents to further criminal activity, to illegally immigrate, etc.";
  • The rapid identification of "problem cases" so resources can be expended on "those who need a more detailed inspection";
  • Cost-benefit analysis arguments for improving passport issuance systems as opposed to the cost of combating fraud investigations and prosecutions;
  • The electronic monitoring and control of all stages of the issuance process;
  • The ability of governments to build 'useful' databases that serve as a uniform source of information to speed the border control process and for tracking 'high risk' categories of traveller;
  • ICAO would also like to see 'the creation of data bases shared voluntarily, even across national boundaries, and between the public and private sectors', which will make it easier to identify people with fraudulently obtained documents; and
  • Honest travellers will be processed more quickly.
ICAO does not however promote an objective reasoning for the development and use of MRTDs and as a result, the website offers few, if any, reservations or precautions concerning the surge towards the global use of these technologies. It should also be highlighted that many of the reasons listed above are out of the jurisdiction of ICAO and are further not substantiated or certain outcomes. In this regard, readers are recommended to visit the 'Issues' section which examines in more detail the implications and effectiveness of the technologies advocated.

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